Category Archives: football

Tom Brady’s guilt? Probable enough (if you aren’t a Patriots fan).

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On good legal advice, it can be stated here that that rascally Tom Brady is in a bind. Because, beyond Brady getting beat up by (non-New England Patriots) fans on the jury in the court of public opinion, the term “more probable than not”—used to cite Brady’s culpability in the case of the squishy NFL footballs—is a valid one in establishing proof.

Furthermore, as Northeastern University law professor Roger Abrams explained in a telephone tutorial, “When the NFL wrote its own rules, unilateral rules, they were not negotiated with the union, because [the league] wanted it as easy as possible to sustain discipline.

“The NFL has its own housekeeping rules,” Abrams said. “If the question is whether the NFL has the power [to suspend Brady for four games], the answer is, ‘Sure.’”

Brady can appeal, and his agent has said he will. And the players’ union can appeal on Brady’s behalf. But either appeal, Abrams said, “does not go to an independent, neutral arbitrator. It’s to a person designated by the commissioner. The NFL has the edge, absolutely.”

It should be noted that Abrams, who has written extensively on law and sports and served as arbitrator in hundreds of legal disputes, was “floored” by the Brady suspension. “The NFL,” he said, “seems unable to get it correct,” citing how the league’s original suspensions in the matters of Ray Rice’s domestic violence, New Orleans Saints bounty practices and Adrian Peterson’s child abuse charges—each of those involving physical harm as opposed to fudging competitive rules by decreasing the air pressure in footballs—all were overturned.

But this is what happens when cloak-and-dagger activity is unearthed in sports, a universe founded on the ideal of the Level Playing Field and so closely scrutinized by passionate, partisan devotees. However stark, raving mad Patriots fans are about having Brady convicted of behavior they insist is neither conclusive nor outside the bounds of common practice around the league, those anti-Patriots loyalists have been just as nuts over Brady’s perceived arrogance and apparent treachery.

This opinion divide was evident in a sampling of New York Times’ reader reactions published Sunday. To both sides of the argument, then, the NFL penalties announced on Monday, including a hefty fine and loss or draft choices for the Patriots, were predictably gasoline on the flames.

The better part of valor in this fight could be humor, as when Columbia University physics and mathematics professor Brian Greene wrote in the Times—soon after the scandal surfaced—that the league’s attempt to obtain expert scientific analysis of pigskin inflation occasioned “one of the rare times when the jocks turn to the nerds….

“So fellow fans of molecules and momentum—climb out of that gym locker you were stuffed into—this is our moment.”

Greene, alluding to “gas physics” and a formula considering volume, pressure and air temperature, slyly concluded that NFL lawyers may “just want to increase their billable hours.” And, taking the meteorological elements into account, “It looks to me that mother nature at least provides a reasonable doubt” about any skullduggery. “So, based on what I know now, your honor, I cannot convict,” Greene wrote.

My friend Charlie Pierce, whose wickedly snarky style is to be envied in these situations, similarly advised that we all calm down. In a piece for the Web site Grantland just prior to the suspension order, Pierce wrote,

“1. I think [Brady] knew damned well what was going on with those footballs. I think his categorical denial at the January press conference was what my old journalism school dean would have called a “barefaced non-fact.” I think he should be suspended two games. And then, good god, people, we should all get on with our lives.

“2. I think anyone who advocates a more serious punishment than that, and anyone who equates Brady with Lance Armstrong or Barry Bonds, is a dangerous child who should be kept away from the public for the same reason we keep toddlers out of the cutlery….”

Meanwhile, back to the “more probable than not” guilt assigned to Brady, the face of the Patriots and—to some extent—the face of the NFL: “What it means in real life,” Abrams said, “is, ‘It could be, maybe it’s not, I’m not too sure.’ It’s 51-percent sure. Which means it’s 49 percent not sure.

“But ‘more probable than not’ is used in civil actions, not criminal actions, for damages in car accidents or breach-of-contract or actions involving real property. Does the evidence [against Brady] meet that standard? Ted Wells [the lawyer who authored the report on the deflation investigation] is a wonderful attorney. Known him for 30 years. I value his work.

“On the other hand, people are picking that report apart.”

In the end, Abrams said, this was “not a legal decision but a policy decision: What’s best for the business?” So what the NFL had to decide was whether it wanted to open the 2015 season on national television—New England vs. Pittsburgh—without the sport’s biggest star? Or wanted to risk, by some relatively meek penalty, reinforcing the notion that rules are not quite the same for superstars?

Either way, what has been aired out, with those footballs, is some of the game’s dirty laundry.

 

NFL draft: Razzle dazzle and “95 percent chance”

(si.com)

(si.com)

Those partners in prime time, the NFL and ESPN, are about to elbow their way into the sports spotlight with a sports event that isn’t really a sports event—the NFL draft.

There is no actual competition involved in this big orchestrated fuss. No winner or loser. No consequence of any sort for months—perhaps years—down the road. Yet the NFL draft is the most scrutinized, monetized, oversized affair on the sports calendar this side of the Super Bowl.

Newspapers, magazines and Web sites—not to the mention the self-promoters on ESPN’s many platforms—already are flooded with mock drafts, endless speculation and overwrought analyses by battalions of experts considering the possibilities of the first few dozen picks.

It’s all just educated guessing, infused with an air of sophistication, though certainly far removed from the league’s first draft in 1936. Then, no team had a scouting department and Wellington Mara, son of New York Giants’ original owner Tim Mara, took on the aura of a drafting genius simply by subscribing to magazines and out-of-town papers to build dossiers of college players across the country.

The first NFL scout wasn’t hired until the Los Angeles Rams paid a fellow named Eddie Kotal in 1946. And, until ESPN president Chet Simmons, in 1980, convinced a wary Pete Rozelle, then the NFL commissioner, that fans actually would watch a televised draft, team representatives simply gathered in a hotel ballroom—usually in Chicago, Philadelphia or New York—and relayed their picks via telephone. Mostly to be reported in the small print of the following day’s papers.

(cleveland.com)

(cleveland.com)

I first covered the draft in 1977. Neither the Giants head coach, John McVay, nor their No. 1 pick, USC defensive lineman Gary Jeter, were anywhere near the New York hotel draft headquarters. Both—McVay from the Giants’ New Jersey base and Jeter from his home in Los Angeles—spoke briefly by phone to a handful of reporters.

There was no “No. 1” jersey unfurled in front of Jeter for the cameras, no smiling commissioner high-fiving and hugging Jeter, no perfectly coiffed Mel Kiper breathlessly updating which team was “on the clock” and which college players still were “on the board.”

Now, teams undeniably put an enormous amount of time and money into the effort. But what the draft show ultimately pedals to the public is the process of general managers being hoisted on their own petard of having Too Much Information.

Last year, a 538.com analysis found GMs to be “victims of their own obsessive pre-draft preparations—their skill level has increased so much that only the effects of chance remain….[and] much of what each team gets from its draft picks….is determined by pure chance.”

Since 2008, academics Cade Massey, now a Wharton economics professor at the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Chicago’s Richard Thalen have been updating “The Loser’s Curse” study, which paints NFL general managers as regular victims of their own overconfidence.

Massey and Thalen have documented that the best value in the draft comes somewhere between a late first-round and early- to mid-second-round choice, because teams—-so convinced they know more than the next guy—-routinely pay too much money for the highest picks. In reality, there is virtually equal knowledge of player talent throughout the league, Massey and Thalen found, with “no observable differences in [draft] skills across teams” and therefore outcomes that are “95-plus percent chance.”

So the aggregate effect of the whole exercise is fairly trivial, just another version of a televised Survivor or The Voice. Decidedly not a sports event. No matter; the most significant impact of the draft is to assure there is no off-season in pro football, that aggressively marketing another aspect of the NFL operation is a way to steal the thunder from the NBA and NHL playoffs and push ever-present baseball into the shadows at will.

According to sports economist Roger Noll, NFL teams in fact use the draft to collectively “eliminate competition for the best rookies, thereby reducing salaries” to the highest picks. My friend Jay Weiner, for years a chronicler of sports business, called the draft “as much a sporting event as the slave trade was a job fair.”

Give the NFL this, though: Its draft is very 21st Century. It is audience empowerment. Interactive. Real fantasy football. Like the Super Bowl, it is profoundly exaggerated, all razzle dazzle and hyperbole.

But, at least with the Super Bowl, there is a final score.

 

 

Donald Trump for president? Ask the old USFL folks

 

For anyone out there who thinks Donald Trump should not run for president, the good news is that Trump has announced he is forming an exploratory committee to consider running for president. Because, by now, the world surely understands that The Donald regularly deals in bunkum, far quicker to offer a bluff than produce a [small-T] trump.

“Americans,” Trump said in a statement threatening his White House campaign, “deserve better than what they get from their politicians—who are all talk and no action.”

Ho, boy. You could say it takes one to know one, and Trump has been road-testing his bluster for more than 30 years. Let me take you back to his most significant involvement in the sports world, when Trump, then 37, spent $9 million to buy the New York Generals in the short-lived United States Football League.

That was in 1984. The USFL, not quite bold enough to take on the established NFL, was organized as a springtime league. At the time Trump, son of a multimillionaire New York builder, already had the reputation as an attention hog. (His chief competitor in the high-powered real-estate world then, Sam Lefrak, said of him, “Kid only knows how to talk, not to build.”)

Still Trump, as the new owner of the Generals, whom he had purchased from Oklahoma oil tycoon J. Walter Duncan, commenced talking about all the things he would build in the USFL–which, it should be said, at least didn’t mind the free publicity.

Trump said he would hire Don Shula, who had just coached the fifth of his six Super Bowl teams in 1983, away from the Miami Dolphins. He said he was negotiating to bring all-NFL lineman Randy White from the Dallas Cowboys. He said he was close to a deal to spirit away all-pro linebacker Lawrence Taylor from the Giants.

None of that happened. When Shula announced his decision to withdraw from Generals consideration, Trump quickly claimed that he—Trump—had pulled back his offer rather than include a Shula apartment in the showy Trump Tower. Shula wryly countered, “I had my press conference first.”

Trump also maintained that, at a meeting of USFL owners shortly after joining their club, “the subject of moving our season to the fall didn’t come up until I brought it up. I brought it up and spoke for a half hour, and when I was finished, if a vote had been taken, I believe it would have been 12-6 or 13-5 in favor of switching to the fall.”

Fellow USFL officials strongly denied that. “I would suggest,” said Vince Lombardi Jr., then president and general manager of the Michigan franchise, “that Don is out there on his own on this. More than any other issue.”

Trump, who said his Manhattan tower had 68 stories when there really were only 59, said the Generals’ season-ticket sales in 1984 were at 40,000, when they actually were at 32,000. (The Generals played in the old Giants Stadium, with a capacity of 77,000.)

Trump had been among the original candidates for USFL ownership in 1983, “but it didn’t work out,” Tampa franchise owner John Bassett told me after Trump came aboard. “Why? That depends on who you talk to. If you talk to me, I tell everybody that he didn’t put up the $5,000 assessment, so we kicked him out. Which is true. If you talk to him, he tells everybody that he was busy with his real estate matters and wanted to play in the fall. Which is also true.”

So there are different angles of truth. But here is what actually happened in the USFL-Trump adventure. As the league dwindled to eight teams, there indeed was a decision to move USFL games to the fall, in direct competition with the NFL, for the 1986 season. Instead, the USFL folded.

And, just this past year, after Trump lost a bidding war to buy the NFL’s Buffalo Bills for $1.4 billion, Trump insisted via Twitter, “Even though I refused to pay a ridiculous price for the Buffalo Bills, I would have produced a winner. Now that won’t happen.”

For anyone out there who is a Bills fan, what did happen may be good news.

Play calls have gone terribly awry before Super Bowl 49

So, here was my story for Newsday in the Nov. 20, 1978 edition (which came to mind after some commentator or another called Seattle’s final pass attempt in Sunday’s Super Bowl “the dumbest call in the history of the National Football League…”)

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East Rutherford, N.J.—To the Giants’ coaching staff—specifically, offensive coordinator Bob Gibson—went the George Custer Medal for Incredibly Faulty Calculations. Oh, the Giants and their fans were ready to hang that one around his neck, all right.

Let’s go to the videotape, just the last 20 seconds of yesterday’s Giants vs. Philadelphia Eagles game: Giants lead, 17-12. Third-and-two at their 29-yard line. Clock running. Philadelphia has neither the ball nor any timeouts remaining. Many of the 70,318 fans had begun filing out of the stadium a minute before, when Giants safety Odis McKinney intercepted a pass, deflected through Mike Hogan’s hands, at the Giants’ 10.

Apparently the Giants have won their sixth game—the first time since 1972 they have won more than five. The sensible wisdom of the moment is quite obvious: Be conservative. As one would turn out the lights when leaving a room, one would likewise have his quarterback assume the fetal position—football embraced close to the stomach—and lie there until the last few seconds of the game go away.

But Gibson, in a hurried phone conversation from the press box with the other coaches, orders quarterback Joe Pisarcik to hand off to fullback Larry Csonka off tackle. Further, the play dictates that Pisarcik do a dance step, a reverse spin before the handoff.

And Pisarcik—oh, my…he FUMBLES. Philadelphia cornerback Herman Edwards has the ball…on the RUN…and…and…

Dramatic, no? Philadelphia wins, 19-17. After it surely had lost.

To the Eagles—specifically, Edwards—went the Little Engine That Could Ribbon for hanging in there. His run with the Pisarcik fumble covered 26 yards and was as easy as it was totally unreasonable. “Things like that,” Edwards said, “well, that’s why you keep playing every play, right to the end. I don’t know why it happened or what happened. The ball just fell out. There was no hit on the play….”

Back to the videotape: Pisarcik, as he turns, has the ball begin to slip off his fingers. Anyway, as he looks to find Csonka, Csonka already has passed. The ball appears to float from Pisarcik like a soap bubble; on closer inspection, it apparently brushes Csonka’s hip.

Gibson avoided the post-game elevator when he noticed reporters already aboard. Outside the press box, angry fans called for almost five minutes, “We want Gibson! Send that bum out here!”

To head coach John McVay, facing a large room full of pencils and pads and microphones after the game, went the Patience Citation for repeating—many times—the coaching staff’s reasoning for not having Pisarcik fall on the ball.

“You run that play 500 times and you don’t fumble,” McVay said, reduced to a shrug and a sigh. “There was an Eagles’ kid lying around on the ground for a while there. Maybe they were faking an injury, and we didn’t want to get the clock stopped on that, so we decided we’d go for the first down. We figure that’s a pretty secure play, guys. A hand-off to the fullback has got to be a secure play.”

Hardly anybody agreed. Once again, the videotape; a closeup of the Giants huddle: “In that situation,” Giants center Jim Clack said, “you fall on it. When Joe came into the huddle and called the play, everybody in the huddle—EVERYBODY in the huddle—said, ‘Let’s fall on it. Let’s don’t take a chance.’ But Joe, well, he can’t just change a call like that.”

Pisarcik said, “Sure, the thought went through my mind to just fall on it, But….”

But earlier this year Pisarcik was “yelled at pretty good” (Clack’s words) for changing a play call sent down from the press box by Gibson. Pisarcik admitted that, saying, “Hey, sure. I’ve been yelled at. More than once.”

To Pisarcik, then, went the Ulysses Plaque for Carrying On Despite Various and Frustrating Rough Journeys. Pisarcik’s teammates and, in fact, even director of operations Andy Robustelli, made it clear that blame for the play should not be placed on the quarterback. “My main concern,” Robustelli said, “is Joe. That the players stand behind him. We have to make sure the players don’t lose confidence in what we’re doing. I didn’t agree with the call.”

The more the play was replayed, the more outrageous it seemed to the Giants. To the Eagles, too. “I wish that wouldn’t happen against the Giants,” Philadelphia linebacker Bill Bergey said. “Dallas or Washington, yes. The Giants, no.”

So unacceptable was the manner of defeat that a Giants’ helmet came flying onto the field as Edwards bounced up and down in the end zone with his teammates. Towels and other handy items were hurled among the Giants. “I was ducking helmets,” said reserve quarterback Randy Dean. Linebacker Harry Carson remained seated alone on the Giants’ bench for five full minutes after the game. Approached later in the lockerroom, he said, “Don’t ask,” and walked out. Pisarcik, when first approached by reporters, bellowed, “Get out of here!”

Probably tackle Brad Benson was best able to reason it out. “If the uncertain things didn’t happen in football,” he said, “then why would people come out and watch us play? But the bad part for me is that I really enjoyed it until the end.”

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[I came to think of that play as Moby Fumble (Thar the Giants Blow It!), as the Archduke’s Assassination—similar to the incident that triggered World War I, that fumble led immediately to the firing of Bob Gibson and, at the end of the season, the firing of John McVay and the resignation of Andy Robustelli. That play left the Giants in ruins. And the New York Times reported today that Gibson, who had been a close friend to McVay for years and that season had carpooled daily from their New Jersey homes to Giants’ practices with McVay, never coached again, never spoke publicly—and almost never privately—about the fumble. And recently was diagnosed with cancer.]

Football and underinflated heads

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In the run-up to the Super Bowl, amid too much attention to shrunken footballs, let us consider deflated heads. This week’s report of another deceased player found to have suffered from head-trauma disease related to the sport, and a medical study revealing increased risk of memory problems for kids who play tackle football prior to age 12, are what ought to scare the stuffing out of the NFL.

This is the kind of real news—as opposed to the vacuous Super Bowl media angst over players who won’t answer questions, Tom Brady’s sniffles and the chain-of-custody for game balls—that speaks to the future health of a $10-billion-a-year business. That so many former players, and potentially so many children entering the sport, will be losing their marbles prematurely would appear to dull the Big Game’s usual fireworks-and-marching-bands atmosphere.

And it could gradually siphon off future talent and fans, which is why the NFL, as reported by the New York Times, has been taking evasive action by backing nationwide Mom Clinics, meant to convince parents about the safety of having their tykes—as young as 5 years old—cracking heads in youth leagues.

It has become fairly standard for the NFL, and many of its players, to reference increased study of concussions and improved protocol in treating head injuries as their assurance against having a screw loose in later life. True enough that we all have learned plenty about the dangers over the years.

Long ago and far away, during my high school days on the football team in Hobbs, N.M., we dismissed “getting our bell rung” as an insignificant test of toughness. My friend Ronnie Foster, in fact, perfected a ball-carrying style in which he would lower his head to meet a would-be tackler, spinning away from the helmet-to-helmet blow to keep on going. I tried this in practice, with some success, but was fortunate to spend most of my time on the bench, so that I never got enough game-time action to render myself any goofier than I am.

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That was 1964. In 2002, Dr. Bennet Omalu, a forensic neuropathlogist, diagnosed so-called “punch-drunk” syndrome—specifically, CTE, or chronic traumatic encephalopathy—during his autopsy of former Pittsburgh Steelers lineman Mike Webster. But it wasn’t until 2010 that the NFL announced it was hanging posters in all of its teams’ lockerrooms to warn players about the long-term dangers of head trauma.

“Why this took so long, I don’t know,” Omalu told me in a telephone conversation at the time. “I’m no genius; this is something I read about in medical school more than 20 years ago.” Since Omalu’s discovery about Webster, CTE repeatedly has been found in deceased old players. Former New England Patriots running back Mosi Tatupu, who died at 54 in 2010, was the latest cited in a Wednesday Boston Globe article.

Of course, there have been rule changes to prevent “targeting the head area,” restrictions on contact in practice and scientific work on finding the perfect helmet. But Omalu has argued that brain damage results not just from specifically diagnosed concussions but also from repeated blows to the head, and that helmets “do not prevent concussions or sub-concussions, because they don’t stop the brain from bumping around in the skull.”

“We have to take the head out of the game,” he said.

As a cerebral exercise, discovering a way to do that—and still have football as we know it—is a far bigger challenge than keeping all the pigskins inflated properly. Especially when fellows such as Jim Tressel, when he coached at Ohio State last decade, instituted the “Jack Tatum Hit of the Week Award,” glamorizing the viciously aggressive defensive play of a man known as the “Assassin,” and whose savage 1978 hit on New England’s Darryl Stingley left Stingley paralyzed the last 29 years of his life.

Maybe not everyone in football has a screw loose, though. A year ago, the school board in Marshall, Tex.—which fields a perennial state gridiron powerhouse and where Hall of Fame quarterback Y.A. Tittle played high school ball—approved plans to replace the district’s entry-level, tackle-football teams for seventh graders with a flag-football program. At least until they are a little older, those Marshall kids won’t have deflated heads.

Deflating footballs, pumping up the Super Bowl

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In the investigation of shrunken footballs, we are reassured that one thing that will not be underinflated is the Super Bowl itself. The whole idea of the NFL’s traditional two-week gap between its conference championships and the Big Game is to pump an otherwise empty information vacuum full of hot air. And this fits the bill perfectly.

From the earliest of its XLIX—sorry, 49—editions, the Super Bowl has succeeded at being America’s most puffed-up happening, an over-the-top exercise in nothing of real consequence. To now have a morsel of scandal for conspiracy theorists to chew on, and for thousands in the sporting press to comb over, feeds the ballyhoo beast.

This is all about hue and cry. And a reminder that annual media protestations of the NFL bamboozling the public with Super Bowl hype—even as said media gleefully traffic in such overkill—miss the point. That is: The Super Bowl defines hyperbole. It oozes hyperbole. It seethes with hyperbole. It strives for (and achieves) wretched excess—a self-important, overdone confluence of all that is modern America: Cut-throat competition, commercialism, conspicuous consumption, televised violence, with a clear hankering back to a male-dominated society.

The hand wringing by some pundits, that the deflated-ball caper will degrade this year’s Super Bowl, from an elite game to a spectacle, reveals a decided ignorance of the fact that the NFL purposely evolved the thing into a spectacle decades ago. The express purpose of Super Bowl exaggeration is to draw in the non-football fan, and now the curiosity about whether New England coach Bill Belichick or quarterback Tom Brady might try something sneaky guarantees more eyeballs.

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The Super Bowl already is the most watched TV show every year, and proof-positive that we have become a spectator society. The Super Bowl Party, once a village, has morphed into an entire nation, with less and less to do with the game and more an experience in overindulgence, to the delight of businesses dealing in nachos, adult beverage and gambling.

Running with such an overdose concept, a North Carolina man created a Web site in 2007 seeking 50,000 signatures to propose, to his local Congresswoman, a day-after-the-game national holiday. That effort, in the grand American tradition of a three-day weekend and in recognition of the debilitating Super Sunday immoderation, failed. But the idea was revived last year by a fantasy football group that submitted a petition to the Obama administration’s “We the People” site, which invites citizens’ voices in governing. (Among current “We the People” petitions—alongside those on issues of same-sex marriage, the Michael Brown case and mandatory vaccinations—are three railing about NFL officiating—which may be further proof that we are not a profound people.)

Consider that a 2011 essay by Robert Lipsyte, the unusually perceptive practitioner of sports journalism, argued that the annual National Football Lollapalooza might be the “only super thing we have left” in this land. “Super power, super economy, super you-name-it….gone,” Lipsyte wrote. Leaving us with a national holiday that rivals Christmas and Thanksgiving while serving as a proxy for military and economic superiority.

What we seem to be stuck with is the Super Bowl dichotomy of triviality and significance, which certainly was on full display as far back as the first of seven Super Bowls I covered for Newsday, in 1974.

That year, Miami’s future Hall of Fame linebacker Nick Buoniconti confided to a couple of us ink-stained wretches that his coach, Don Shula, had overruled team doctors who planned surgery on Buoniconti’s elbow just before the game. Five Miami players, in fact, acknowledged having to play with various pins in their bodies to hold together broken bones. (One of those five, safety Jake Scott, kidded darkly that the team’s biggest fear was a “lightning storm.”) The game clearly was a big deal.

Meanwhile, though, I spent an afternoon during that year’s Super Bowl media day with the self-proclaimed “gonzo journalist” Hunter S. Thompson, who had covered two presidential elections and gained fame with his surreal, drug-infused novel “Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas.” Thompson had been assigned to chronicle the week’s theoretically crucial doings for Rolling Stone magazine, and found, instead, that “I feel like calling my editor and telling him there’s no story here. There really isn’t anything happening.”

If Thompson were still around—he committed suicide in 2007—I doubt he’d be shocked about allegations that New England fudged the rules by shriveling some footballs. Nor should we be, given how athletes so regularly are praised for their “competitiveness” and lauded for attempts to get any edge possible. The euphemism for bending rules is the honored skill of “gamesmanship.” Another bit of news at the 1974 Super Bowl was then-commissioner Pete Rozelle’s admission that seven teams had hidden players beyond their roster limits during the season as a hedge against injuries.

Dishonesty aside, the current  mischief, rather than a buzz-killer, has been a godsend to sports talk radio and an attention-grabbing bonanza for the NFL. The already bloated Super Bowl continues to expand in our consciousness.